Journal of Intelligent Marketing Management

Journal of Intelligent Marketing Management

The Political Economy of Blockchain Technology and the Cryptocurrency Market in the Age of Sanctions: Dollar Hegemony, Escape Networks, and the New Financial Order

Document Type : Excerpt from master's thesis

Authors
1 Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Economy and Policy, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabataba’i University
Abstract
The international political‑economy system is undergoing a historic and fundamental transition from a centralized structure that for decades rested on the hegemony of the US dollar, Western financial institutions, and intermediary messaging systems. This profound shift toward a complex, fragmented, and digitally distributed network architecture is manifest above all in the escalating strategic confrontation between stringent sanctions regimes and emerging technologies such as distributed ledgers (blockchain) and digital assets (cryptocurrencies). In recent decades the United States has leveraged financial choke points and exercised power through networks like SWIFT to block sanctioned countries’ access to capital markets; the rise of decentralized ecosystems, however, poses a serious challenge to these classical assumptions.
This study adopts an analytical and critical approach, combining theoretical inquiry with econometric data, to examine in detail the political‑economy dynamics of decentralized financial technologies in the context of international sanctions. Drawing on advanced International Political Economy frameworks—particularly the concept of structural power and the theory of weaponized interdependence—the paper shows how sanctioned states and entities have weakened the monopoly and dominance of traditional monetary networks by developing digital evasion architectures.
A comprehensive analysis of statistical data and intelligence reports from 2024–2026 indicates that the cryptocurrency market has evolved from a speculative instrument into a critical infrastructure of the shadow economy. According to the findings, the volume of crypto transactions associated with sanctions circumvention reached a historic, unprecedented high of $158 billion in 2025, a 400% increase, largely driven by states’ instrumental use of stablecoins. Comparative case studies reveal the emergence of three strategic models among sanctioned actors—centralized, decentralized, and hybrid. The Russian Federation has facilitated trade through institutionalized infrastructures such as a digital ruble and regional ruble‑backed stablecoins (e.g., A7A5). The Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued a hybrid policy: legalizing cryptocurrency mining to finance imports while using the stablecoin Tether on the low‑cost Tron network for large commercial settlements.
Keywords
Subjects

Almeida, J., & Gonçalves, T. C. (2026). Cryptocurrencies and economic sanctions. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 81, Article 102537.
Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42-79. Gürcan, E. C., & Donduran, C. (2024). China on the Rise: The Transformation of Structural Power in the Era of Multipolarity. Routledge.
Mytelka, L. K. (2000). Knowledge and Structural Power in the International Political Economy. In Strange Power (pp. 18). Routledge. Cohen, B. J. (2019). Money, power, authority. University of California, Santa Barbara
Brownworth, A. (2024). Evidence from Sanctions on Tornado Cash. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 1112. Moghadam, R. K. (2025). Lessons from a Parallel Economy: Crypto and the Limits of Central Banks. Banque de France, Eco Notepad.
Liang, N. (2025). Stablecoins: Issues for regulators as they implement GENIUS Act. Brookings Institution. Prokopenko, A. (2024). Russia's Digital Ruble Development. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Davis Center. (2024). Blockchain Statecraft: Russia's Secret War for Financial Sovereignty. Harvard University. Massarotto, G. (2026). Decentralization, Blockchain, and Political Economy. Wharton Public Policy Initiative.
Ekshian, E. V. (2025). The Digital Economy and Sanctions: How Geopolitical Pressure is Fueling Alternative Economic Ecosystems. FGV Europe Think Series.
Chainalysis. (2026). 2026 Crypto Crime Report: Crypto Crime Reaches Record High in 2025 as NationState Sanctions Evasion Moves OnChain at Scale.
TRM Labs. (2026). 2026 Crypto Crime Report.
Anonymous. (2024). Statistical assessment of sanctions effectiveness in the crypto ecosystem. arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.10031.
Berg, C. (2018). The entangled political economy of the blockchain. SSRN Electronic Journal, 3158805. Hendrickson, J. R., & Warmke, C. (2025). Sanctions and Sanctions-Resistant Money. SSRN Electronic Journal.
Columbia Economics. (2026). Digitalizing Dominance: How GENIUS Act Reinforces US Dollar Hegemony. Columbia University News. Chavanette. (2026). Tickertape 164: mBridge transaction volume hit $55.5 billion.